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1“When an industry has thus chosen a locality ... it is likely to stay there ... so great
are the advantages ... The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were
in the air,... inventions and improvements in machinery, in processes and the general
organization of the business have the merits promptly discussed; if one man starts a new
idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own...” (Marshall
(1890), IV,x,3)
1 Introduction
The international diﬀusion of ideas lies at the heart of economic growth and the im-
provement of the welfare of nations. Unlike most commodities, knowledge is hard to
appropriate by its inventors and “spills over” to other agents in the economy. Under-
standing how knowledge spreads is key to understanding a number of growth enhancing
policies (for example, to work out the optimal subsidy to R&D or the degree of intellec-
tual property protection). In this paper we revisit the question of whether geographic
proximity plays an important role in the spread of knowledge and in particular how this
has changed over time. In the popular imagination the notion of the “death of distance”
(Friedman, 2005, Cairncross, 1997; Coyle, 1997) expresses the idea that information now
travels around the globe at rapid speed. Under this view, ideas generated in California
spread to Calcutta or Coventry through the Internet, conferences, telephone and other
communication devices at an unprecedented rate, and international boundaries play lit-
tle role. There is some empirical evidence to support this view (see, inter alia, Keller
(2002) and Thompson (2006)).
There are also several counter-arguments that suggest that geographical proximity
continues to exert a strong inﬂuence over knowledge ﬂows. Indeed, in the trade literature
there is little evidence that distance has become any less important for trade ﬂows (e.g.
the meta-analysis of Disdier and Head, 2008 or Leamer, 2007), and some evidence that its
importance may have actually increased (e.g. Evans and Harrigan, 2005, and references
therein). Distance may still matter if face-to-face interaction is important even in high
tech sectors, because knowledge is tacit and hard to codify. Globalization may also
2mean increasing specialization in the technologies where countries have comparative
advantage, implying that they have “less to learn” from one another. So ultimately this
is an empirical question - do technology spillovers increase with geographic proximity
and has this changed over time?
Figure 1 presents some raw data that is consistent with the view that distance has
become less important over time for the international transmission of ideas (we will
discuss the data in much more detail later in the paper). We plot the relative speed
of patent citations over time. For example, in the top left panel consider successful
applications to the US Patent Oﬃce for inventors living in Germany in an “early”
period (1975-1989) on the left and then in a “later” period (1990-1999) on the right.
Looking ﬁrst at the early period, the height of each bar indicates how much slower
foreign inventors were in being ﬁrst to cite German inventors relative to other German
inventors. So American inventors were about 40% slower in citing Germans patents than
Germans themselves and the French were about 25% slower. The fact that the bars are
almost all positive suggests the well-known phenomenon of home bias in ideas - Germans
are quicker at citing other Germans, British quicker at citing other British, etc. What
is more interesting about Figure 1 is how home bias has changed over time. On average
the bars in the later period are lower than the bars in the earlier period, suggesting
that home bias in ideas has fallen, consistent with some “death of distance” ideas. In
the post 1990 period, Americans are only about 20% slower in citing Germans and the
French are only about 10% slower in citing Germans, than the Germans themselves.
Table 1 holds the underlying data: the average time to the ﬁrst citation in the early
period from a German inventor to another German inventor was 1,383 days compared
to 1,901 days for an American inventor. This shows that home bias exists. The speed of
transmission within Germany increased over time - in the later period the average time
to ﬁrst citation was only 880 days. But the fall was even greater elsewhere: the time to
3ﬁrst American citation fell to 1,054.
Looking across Figure 1 as a whole, the pattern is repeated in most regions - foreigners
became relatively much quicker at citing domestic patents after 1990.1 There are, of
course, many reasons why the simple patterns in the raw data might be misleading,
and much of this paper is devoted to developing and implementing the appropriate
econometric tools to show that the results in the raw data are essentially robust to
controlling for confounding factors such as unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring.
In terms of related literature, it is well known that tracking international knowledge
spillovers is a diﬃcult task. One branch of the literature tries to identify the transfer
of technology indirectly by examining changing rates of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth across countries and assuming that the faster productivity growth rates of (some)
countries or industries that lie further behind the frontier is due to the transfer of ideas.2
While attractive in its simplicity, a drawback of this approach is that it only provides
indirect evidence, the positive correlation between productivity growth and the lagged
productivity gap could represent many statistical and economic mechanisms that have
nothing to do with the spread of ideas.
A second branch of the literature takes a production function and includes the R&D
of other countries as an additional variable. These papers tend to ﬁnd that the R&D of
other countries is valuable, but usually not as valuable as R&D in the domestic economy.3
Most closely related to this paper, Keller (2002) takes this approach and ﬁnds evidence
1There are other interesting features in Figure 1 over and above the general fall in home bias. First,
Japanese inventors appear particularly quick at citing other countries’ inventors and this has grown
stronger over time. Second, although home bias has fallen for the US with respect to the Rest of World,
it has if anything increased with respect to the main EU countries (Germany, France and Britain). As
we will see in the econometric section, once we control for other factors, there is not much evidence for
home bias of US inventions in the later period.
2For example see Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen (2004).
3For an introduction to spillovers in general see Griliches (1992). At the cross country level see Coe
and Helpman (1995) and Keller (1998). At the industry level see Bernstein and Mohnen (1998). Work
at the ﬁrm level ﬁnds evidence that countries’ behind the frontier beneﬁt much more from frontier R&D
than vice versa, see Bransetter (2001), Bransetter and Sakibora (2002) and Griﬃth, Harrison and Van
Reenen (2006).
4that technology has become more global over time. This approach has the advantage
of using a direct measure of technology, however, it is necessary to identify the relevant
external pool of information (i.e. to ﬁnd a way to appropriately weight the R&D of
other countries by order of importance) and the correlation of productivity with R&D
is still a very indirect measure of the spillover itself.
A third branch is based around using patent citation information as a direct measure
of the transfer of knowledge. The citation of one patent by another strongly suggests that
the ﬁrst patent contained useful knowledge which helped the second innovation. A classic
paper in this ﬁeld is Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), which uses a matching
methodology to show that inventors were far more likely to cite other inventors living
in geographic proximity (e.g. the same state or country) when compared to inventors in
other states or countries. Several papers have followed this approach, and a consensus
has emerged that knowledge is subject to a signiﬁcant degree of “home bias”. As with
the R&D-production function, distance appears to matter.4 Most closely related to our
work Thompson (2006) uses citation data to investigate the localization of knowledge
spillovers and ﬁnds evidence to suggest that this has declined over time.
In this paper we also use citations to proxy knowledge spillovers but take a somewhat
diﬀerent approach. We consider the speed with which a patent is cited, and propose
a duration modelling framework that explicitly deals with the problem of unobserved
patent characteristics that may be correlated with location or other characteristics. To
see how ﬁxed eﬀects could generate a bias consider the case of two countries - the US and
Japan. Assume that higher quality patents will be cited more quickly than lower quality
patents. If US inventors produce higher quality patents and inventors that produce
higher quality patents are also more nimble at using the ideas of other countries then we
4For example, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) found that inventors in one country were far more likely
to cite inventors living in the same country than in other countries, although this diﬀerence tended
to diminish over time. Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) argue that using more disaggregated patent
classes drives away localization eﬀects within the US, but they still observe home bias between the US
and other countries. See also Henderson, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2005) for a rejoinder.
5will observe that US inventors will tend to cite other US inventors more than they cite
Japanese inventors. This will give the impression of “home bias” whereas in fact it is to
do with the higher average quality of US inventors which leads to both the generation
of new knowledge and the faster absorption of older knowledge. Controlling for ﬁxed
eﬀects will therefore reduce the degree of “home bias” observed in naive estimators5.
Using a duration model without ﬁxed eﬀects we ﬁnd evidence of large home bias, in
line with the most of the existing literature. But, we ﬁnd that home bias is partly a sta-
tistical artefact of the failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. diﬀerences in
patent quality). This heterogeneity has been found to be an important feature of patent
values (e.g. Pakes, 1986). Our most important ﬁnding is that even after controlling
for ﬁxed eﬀects, other covariates and censoring inter-country home bias appears to have
fallen over time. This is consistent with the raw data shown in Figure 1 and Table 1.
Other econometric evidence that we are aware of that shows that geography matters less
over time is Keller (2002) and Thompson (2006), mentioned above, and Kim, Morse and
Zingales (2006), who ﬁnd that the lower apparent degree of spillovers within elite US
university departments.6 Our work provides new evidence that the geographical local-
ization of knowledge spillovers has fallen over time. Furthermore, the fall in home bias
has been greater in the more “traditional” sectors (such as Chemicals and Mechanical
Engineering) than the more “modern” technological sectors (such as the Information
and Communication Technologies sector and the Pharmaceutical sector). The is con-
sistent with the evidence for agglomeration and clustering in these high tech sectors as
5The bias is not easily signed. Consider a second scenario where inventions in Japan remain of lower
quality on average than in the US, but Japanese inventors are faster at absorbing old knowledge than
their US counterparts. This will make it appear that Japanese inventors cite US inventors a lot and
could disguise the existence of home bias. In this case, controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects will remove the bias
and increase the degree of home bias observed in non-ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. In summary, the ﬁxed
eﬀects bias could go in either direction, but certainly could be important.
6A recent paper by Head, Mayer and Ries (2007) estimates a gravity model of trade for services. As
with goods, they ﬁnd no evidence of distance mattering less for services as a whole. However for one
important sub-sector, “miscellaneous business services”, distance does appear to matter less in 2004
than in 1992.
6suggested by some economic geography models (see Redding, 2009).
Our econometric method builds on Chamberlain (1985) and Ridder and Tunali
(1999), which is based on a multiple-spell duration model, is new in the empirical lit-
erature on knowledge spillovers. Our method has several important advantages over
previously used methods in the literature: ﬁrst, we focus on the ﬁrst few citations, for
which we believe geography matters most (note that we are careful to show the sensi-
tivity of our results to using the diﬀerent numbers of citations). Second, we allow for a
very general form of patent heterogeneity, thus providing new empirical evidence that is
unlikely to be driven by diﬀerent qualities or unobserved characteristics of cited patents.
Third, we correct for the censoring problem, which is that newly granted patents are less
likely to be cited by other patents, hence avoiding the standard problem in analyzing
patent citation data. The method we apply has a number of potential applications be-
yond the one we investigate in this paper, for example, one could analyze the degrees of
importance of geography within the United Sates across diﬀerent states. Another pos-
sible application is to look at the extent to which knowledge spreads diﬀerently across
institutions, such as universities, private ﬁrms and government labs.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 sketches our econometric model. Section
3 details the data and Section 4 gives the results. Some concluding comments are in
Section 5. Appendix A provides the details of our estimation method, the asymptotic
distribution of our estimator, and comparisons between our econometric model and
related models in the literature. Appendix B gives additional data description and
estimation results.
72 Modelling Strategy
Consider that there are a set of inventions i = 1,....,I and a set of inventors j = 1,...J.
We take this pool of inventions and inventors as exogenously determined7, with their
numbers growing over time. The inventors will “learn”8 of invention i after a time period
Tij. We think of Tij as the “diﬀusion lag” between invention i and inventor j.
T is is non-negative random variable with distribution F(t) and density f(t). There
are several factors which determine the diﬀusion lag including characteristics of the in-
vention Zi, characteristics of the inventor Zj and the joint characteristics of the invention-
inventor match, Zij. There will be a set of non-geographical variables that will inﬂuence
the speed at which information ﬂows. For example news of a higher quality invention
may travel more quickly as will inventions in a more established technological ﬁelds
compared to newer areas. Similarly, lower quality inventors may be slow in picking up
on news of new technologies. Finally, information will diﬀuse more quickly for inventors
and inventions operating in the same technological ﬁeld compared to those operating in
diﬀerent ﬁelds.
Our main interest is in geographical barriers to knowledge transfusion as proxied
national boundaries. Thus, we hypothesize the non-geographical factors determine the
expected diﬀusion lag, but there will be an additional cost of transmitting information
depending upon whether inventors are located in the same country as an invention or
are in a diﬀerent country. To the extent that this slows down the diﬀusion of knowledge
we will say that there is a “home bias”. Note that this home bias exists over and above
any eﬀect arising that inventions or inventors might be intrinsically faster (or slower) in
picking up knowledge in general. We can control for these by linear country dummies
7Many general equilibrium growth models seek to derive the stocks of inventions and inventors as
endogneously related to the diﬀusion lag (e.g. Cabellero and Jaﬀe 1993), but we abstract from these
considerations here.
8Learning can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways. It is a combination of becoming aware of the inven-
tion, understanding it and then ﬁnding it useful enough to build on to develop new knowledge.
8of invention (CTYi) and inventor (CTYj), with the key home bias term being terms in
whether the particular pair of countries (CTYij) matters for diﬀusion.
The hazard function of the diﬀusion lag is deﬁned as
f(t)
1−F(t) which we model as a
function of observables, Xij incorporating the empirically observable counterparts to Zij
and Zj, and an unobservable ﬁxed eﬀect, Ui which absorbs all the factors speciﬁc to the
cited patent (such as quality).
In our application inventions will be measured by cited patents, inventors by citing
patents and the diﬀusion lag by the duration of the citation lag between invention and
inventor. We estimate the impact of home bias on knowledge spillovers using a multiple-
spell duration model. Consider a patent that is taken out (the cited patent) and the
patents that subsequently cite it (the citing patents) - if geography is important for the
ﬂow of information then we should expect to see that durations are shorter when the
citing inventor is located near the cited inventor. We focus on the ﬁrst few citations.
Geography matters because most of the knowledge in a new invention is tacit, whereas
over time this information becomes codiﬁed. Consequently, over time information about
the invention is more easily transmitted across distances, and researchers with direct
knowledge of the invention become more geographically disperse. We see evidence of
this in the raw patents data. For example, if we look at all patents taken out by German
ﬁrms, and we look at who ﬁrst cites that patent, in 17% of cases it is another ﬁrm located
in Germany, while if we look at the ﬁfth time the patent is cited then 12% are ﬁrms
located in Germany, while by the 10th time the patent is cited 10% are located in
Germany. Looking across other locations we see that the share of cases where the cited
and citing ﬁrm are in the same country falls monotonically, with a higher share of the
1st citations being in the same country.
As highlighted above, unobserved heterogeneity could confound our estimates as
higher quality patents may be cited more quickly. To control for this we use an estimator
9that is analogous to the linear diﬀerence estimator by comparing the ﬁrst and second
citations for each cited patent. By comparing the diﬀerence between the citing patents
we are able to “diﬀerence out” the unobserved characteristics of the cited patent.9
Let subscript i index cited patents and subscript j citing patents. Under this con-
vention, let Y ∗
ij denote the j-th citation duration for the i-th patent, that is the number
of days from the date when the i-th cited patent is granted to the date when the j-th
citing patent is granted, where i = 1,...,n and j = 1,...,J.10 Here n is the the num-
ber of patents and J is the number of (potential) citations for each cited patent. Also,
let Xij denote the attributes of the j-th citing patent for the i-th cited patent and Ui
denote unobserved characteristics of the cited patent. For example, Ui may represent
unobserved quality of the cited patent.
We consider a multiple-spell version of the mixed proportional hazards model. The
hazard that Y ∗
ij = y∗





ijβ + ui) (1)
where β is a vector of unknown parameters and λi(·) is a cited-patent speciﬁc baseline
hazard function.
The citation durations Y ∗
ij are assumed to be independent of each other, conditional
on the observed and unobserved characteristics (Xij,Ui). In addition, the observed
covariates Xij are assumed to be constant within each spell but to vary over spells. For
example, Xij may include the location of the inventor of the j-th citing patent for the i-
th cited patent. We allow Ui to be arbitrarily correlated with Xij and do not impose any
distributional assumptions on Ui, and therefore, Ui is a ﬁxed eﬀect. The multiple-spell
structure allows Ui to have a very general form, compared to unobserved heterogeneity
9See, for example, Chamberlain (1985), Ridder and Tunali (1999), Horowitz and Lee (2004), and
Lee (2008).
10The notation Y ∗
ij is used to reﬂect that Y ∗
ij is a latent variable due to the usual right censoring
problem. In fact, we observe Yij = min(Y ∗
ij,Ci) and ∆ij = 1(Y ∗
ij < Ci), where 1(·) is the usual indicator
function and Ci denotes the censoring time. See Appendix A for details on how to handle censoring.
10in the single-spell duration models. The functional form of the baseline hazard function
λi(·) is unspeciﬁed and it can also vary across diﬀerent cited patents. Therefore, the
model also allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the shape of the hazard function.11
The conditional independence assumption is indispensable in our econometric mod-
elling strategy. The important implication of this assumption is that it requires that one
citation does not lead to another citation. What would cause us problems is if the ﬁrst
citation of a patent provided information to other potential citers and therefore aﬀected
the duration to the next citation.12
Under the conditional independence assumption, such that Y ∗
ij are independent of
each other conditional on (Xij,Ui), we can estimate β using a conditional likelihood
approach (e.g. Chamberlain, 1985; Ridder and Tunali, 1999). The idea behind the
conditional likelihood approach is as follows. Assume that there are only two potential
citing patents (J = 2). The probability that the observed ﬁrst citation duration is ﬁrst,




























which does not depend on ui or λi. Therefore, β can be estimated based on this condi-
tional likelihood without the ‘incidental parameters’ problem.13
11The heterogeneity term Ui is not separately identiﬁed from the baseline hazard function λi(·). The
model in (1) can be re-written as ˜ λi(y∗
ij)exp(x′
ijβ) with ˜ λi = exp(ui)λi.
12While this is of course possible we believe that it is not a major problem in our context because we
are focussing on ﬁrst and second (or third and fourth) citations. Due to the publication lag, the ﬁrst
citation is often not public by time when the second citation is made.
13Thompson (2006) uses Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit model to estimate the eﬀects of
localized knowledge spillovers. His paper is diﬀerent from ours in two main ways. First, he uses pairs of
citing and cited patents to construct the binary matching indicators (the dependent variable), whereas
we start from a multi-spell duration model and then use only the ﬁrst few citations. Second, Thompson
(2006) uses an interaction term between the indicator variable for inventor citations and the cited patent
age to identify the eﬀects of knowledge spillovers, whereas we use the location of the inventor of a citing
patent. See Appendix A.3.2 for more details.
11A usual problem with analyzing such data is censoring. Given any dataset there
will be some patents that have not (yet) been cited, but which could in future be
cited. The standard conditional likelihood approach (see, e.g. Chamberlain, 1985)
can handle censoring if one always observes covariates Xij. In our application, like
many others, Xij are only observed when durations are uncensored. For example, we
can identify the location of the inventor of a citing patent only in the case when it is
observed. This problem forces us to use only uncensored spells and this may introduce a
selection problem. In our data, citation durations are obtained by looking at all recorded
citations at a particular date (December 31st 1999). We therefore treat the censoring as
independent of citation durations and covariates (what we need is that the application
and grant dates are independent of quality), and then weight the observations by the
inverse of the propensity to observe complete spells. This is analogous to the way that
missing data are treated in inverse probability weighted estimation (e.g. Wooldridge,
2007). See Appendix A for details of our estimation method.
There are two main diﬀerences between our approach and the more usual Jaﬀe and
Trajtenberg (1999) approach. First, a major advantage is that we can control for un-
observed heterogeneity in a way that they do not. Consistent with Thompson and
Fox-Kean (2005) we ﬁnd that using three digit technology classes is an inadequate con-
trol as the number of rejections of home bias fall substantially when we include our
ﬁxed eﬀects over and above these technology dummies. Second, as with any ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator a potential disadvantage of our approach is that we use only a sub-sample of
the data that they use (two or more cites instead of all cites). We do not attempt to
characterize the entire shape of the citation function, but rather focus on the ﬁrst few
cites. We believe that this is a natural approach to examining international spillovers,
as localization eﬀects should be strongest soon after a patent is granted when knowledge
is still mostly tacit. Nevertheless, we see this approach as a complement rather than a
12substitute for the Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) model.14 See Appendix A.3 for a more
detailed comparison of our approach with others in the literature.
3 Data
To implement this estimator we use data from the NBER US Patent Citations Data
File.15 These data include information on all patents taken out at the United States
Patent Oﬃce (USPTO) and have been widely used in the economic analysis of spillovers.
Table 2 shows the sample sizes for our analysis. The NBER data consist of patents
granted and citations made to these patents between 1975 and 1999. In total we use
data on over 2.1 million cited patents. While these patents were all taken out in the
USPTO, the assignees and inventors can be located anywhere in the world. We use
the information on the inventors’ addresses to identify the location of the patent.16 We
focus on inventors located in the G5 countries - US, Japan, France, Germany and Great
Britain. We group the remaining EU countries together,17 and then consider the Rest
of the World (“RW”) as the residual category. Unsurprisingly, the US is the leading
country with nearly 1.2 million patents, and Japan is second with nearly 400,000. We
split our sample into two sub-periods, 1975-1989 and 1990-1999, and consider whether
the evidence for home bias diﬀers over these two periods.
Crucially for our purposes, the NBER data contain information on all subsequent
citations to each patent made by other patents. In our baseline results, we use the infor-
mation contained in the ﬁrst and second citations to implement the estimator described
in the previous section. As highlighted above, an issue that arises with using citation
14See Belenzon and Van Reenen (2007) for evidence on the changing time patterns of citations using
an approach closer to Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999).
15See Jaﬀe (1986), Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001), Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Hall, Jaﬀe
and Trajtenberg (2005).
16Where there is more than one inventor we follow Jaﬀe et al (1993) and allocate patents to the
country where the majority of inventors are located. In the case of ties we randomly choose one of the
countries.
17These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
13data is the problem that for some patents (those taken out near the end of the period)
these citations will be censored - that is the ﬁrst or second citation will not have occurred
yet. This is a well documented problem with using citation data18. For example, in our
data (see Table 3), for 28% of patents in the chemicals technology sector we never see
a citation, for 15% we see only one citation, and for the remaining 56% we see two or
more citations. Similar patterns are observed for other technology sectors. Because of
this it is important that our empirical methods correct for censoring biases.
We control for whether or not the citation is a self-citation (i.e. whether the assignee
is the same on the cited and citing patent) and whether or not the cited and citing patent
are in the same technology class. We also control for the size of the base of potential
citing patents, that is the number of patents in the citing country and technology sub-
category for the citing year. We discuss the interpretation of this variable in sub-section
4.4. below, but it is there reﬂect the explosion of patenting which led to some diminution
of average patent quality (see Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Jaﬀe and Lerner, 2004).
Table 3 reports some summary statistics for these control variables by technology
category. In Chemicals, 22% of all ﬁrst citations are self-citations, and this falls to
19% for the second citation. On average across technology sectors just under 20% are
self citations and this declines by 2-4% from the ﬁrst citation to the second citation.
More than 65% of citations are from the same technology class. The proportions of
self-citations, same technology class and the averages of the bases (potential cites) are
characteristics of citing patents and thus they are obtained from only complete citation
spells.
18For example, Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg, (2001) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2002).
144 Results
4.1 Basic Results
We implement the estimator described above on all patents granted by the USPTO
between 1975 and 1999. We report results across seven regions and six technology
categories, and allow all the coeﬃcients to vary across these groups.
4.1.1 An example - Chemical Engineering
We begin by going through the results for one technology category in one country to
illustrate our methodology. In Table 4 we show the coeﬃcient estimates for the citing
country dummies when we look at Chemical Engineering in Germany. Each column in
Table 4 reports the results from a diﬀerent regression. The omitted category is the own
country - the location of the cited patent - which in this case is Germany (DE). There
are potentially 46,697 cited patents in Chemical Engineering in Germany over this time
period, and from this sample 25,016 patents are cited at least twice. The main variables
of interest are the indicators of the country of the citing ﬁrm. Also included in the
regression is an indicator of whether the citation is a self-citation, whether the cited and
citing patent are in the same technology class (three digit), and the total number of
citing patents in that country and technology class for the citing year.
In column (1) of Table 4 we estimate the coeﬃcients using a proportional hazard
model with only the ﬁrst citation duration. This is equivalent to our model without
ﬁxed eﬀects (and constraining the baseline hazard to be the same across patents), i.e.






To keep the sample the same as when estimating the ﬁxed eﬀects model we restrict
the estimation to patents with at least two citations. The coeﬃcients on the country
dummies indicate whether inventors located in that country cite German inventors in
15chemical engineering faster (a positive coeﬃcient) or slower (a negative coeﬃcient) than
inventors from the omitted category (which is always the own country, in this case
Germany). If there is home bias we expect negative coeﬃcients on the other country
dummies, i.e. they are slower to cite than home inventors. In column (1) we see negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on four country dummies; these suggest strong support for
home bias. Japanese inventors are the swiftest foreign group to cite German inventors -
they are actually 3% faster than German inventors themselves, although the estimated
coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. By contrast inventors in France are 15% slower
to cite German patents.
In column (2) of Table 4 we control for unobserved cited patent characteristics (e.g.
quality) which may be correlated with the speed with which the patent is cited, by
estimating the coeﬃcients using the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (without correcting for cen-
soring).19 When ﬁxed eﬀects are included most coeﬃcients become closer to zero and
the all country dummies become statistically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, except
for the rest of the world (RW). This suggests that failure to control for unobserved
heterogeneity increases the degree of home bias.20 The simple ﬁxed eﬀects estimator in
column (2) ignores the problem of censoring. In column (3) we also allow for censor-
ing, which leads to little change in most of the coeﬃcients (but increases the standard
errors a bit), and has relatively little eﬀect on the qualitative ﬁndings. As would be
expected, if the patent is taken out by the same assignee (a self-citation) the citation
speed is signiﬁcantly faster (about 48% faster than non self-citations in column (3)).
Similarly, patents in the same technology class cite each other signiﬁcantly faster (15%
faster than patents in diﬀerent technology classes according to column (3)). Patents in
larger country-technology classes are cited less frequently.
19Speciﬁcally, the estimator maximizes the likelihood equation (A1) in the Appendix without the
correction term Gn(max[Yi1,Yi2]).
20It is possible to have a case in which failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity decreases the
degree of home bias since the direction of bias from failure to control for ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be signed
a priori.
16We continue to illustrate the method by looking across all countries but still restrict-
ing ourselves to patents in the Chemical Engineering category. In Table 5 each row
contains parameter estimates from a separate multiple spell duration model for each
country. For example, the ﬁrst row shows the results from column (3) of Table 4 (the
coeﬃcients on self-citation, technology class and base are not reported). Table 5 shows
only the results for the ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring model (denoted “FE + C”), i.e. the
model shown in column (3) of Table 4.
What do the coeﬃcients in Table 5 tell us? As before, the omitted base category is
always the home country, and negative coeﬃcients suggest home bias. Looking across
the second row for France, we see that only inventors from the “rest of the world”
(mainly developing countries) are signiﬁcantly slower to cite French inventors than the
French themselves: the coeﬃcients for German, British, EU, Japanese, and US inventors
are insigniﬁcant and inventors from the rest of the world are 33% slower to cite French
inventors. So, just as in the German case, we do not see home bias after controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity within the main developed nations. Note that all regressions
include unreported controls for whether the citation is a self citation, whether it is in
the same technology sub-category (three digit) and the total number of citing patents in
that country and technology class (“base”). Most of these controls are highly signiﬁcant
and would lead to the impression of home bias if omitted.21 The story is diﬀerent if
we look at the US (row (6) in Table 5). All countries except Germany are signiﬁcantly
slower to cite US investors than the American themselves: the French inventors are
15% slower to cite US inventors, British are 10% slower, other Europeans 22% slower,
Japanese 6% slower, and the rest of world 24% slower. A similar pattern exists for Japan
- the European countries are much slower to cite Japanese patents than the Japanese
themselves.
We give a graphical representation of the results from Table 5 in Figure 2 to make
21This is true for all econometric models, as seen in all columns in Table 4.
17it easier to eyeball the results. Each cell corresponds to the equivalent cell in Table 5.
A circle represents a negative coeﬃcient (home bias) and a cross represents a positive
coeﬃcient. The size of the circle or the cross corresponds to the level of statistical
signiﬁcance of a one-sided test for the null hypothesis that the corresponding coeﬃcient
is zero. A large circle represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level, a medium circle signiﬁcance
at the 5% level, a small circle signiﬁcance at the 10% level, and a tiny circle insigniﬁcance
at the 10% level. The same ordering applies to crosses. The leading diagonal corresponds
to the omitted variable in each regression and therefore no coeﬃcient is estimated or
displayed.22 So it is possible to immediately detect the degree of home bias for a country
by looking at the number and size of circles across a row. The United States as country
of cited patents, for example, has a full row of large circles indicating signiﬁcant home
bias, whereas European countries do not (this feature is not apparent from the raw
data from all sectors in Figure 1). It is also clear from Figure 2 that there is less
home bias among the EU countries (points in the top-left quadrant marked with the
dashed line box), compared to between the non-EU countries and EU countries. The
top right quadrant contains no rejections for the Japan and US columns, suggesting
that Japan and the US are no slower in citing European patents than European own
inventors; however, the bottom left quadrant contains many rejections for the Japan
and US rows, suggesting that European countries (except Germany) are slower in citing
Japanese and US patents. Hence, there exists an interesting asymmetry between the
European block and the Japan/US block, in the sense that European inventors are slow
to cite Japanese and American patents but Japan/US-located inventors are quick to cite
European patents. Another interesting asymmetry exists - the rest of the world is slow
to cite main developed countries, while the main developed countries are quick to cite
the rest of the world23.
22A full set of results are available on request from the authors.
23Germany is diﬀerent to the other European countries in that it is particularly quick to cite other
countries in Chemicals, but not other industries (see Figure 3). This may be because Germany has a
184.1.2 Main Results
We conduct the equivalent analysis across all seven regions and six sectors. Table 6
summarizes the results (full results available on request). The number of rejections of
one-sided t-tests for the coeﬃcients on country dummies are shown for each sector. Test
results are shown for three levels (1%, 5%, and 10%) using the no ﬁxed eﬀect hazard
model estimator (“No FE”), the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (“FE”), and the censored ﬁxed
eﬀect estimator (“FE+C”).
The ﬁrst striking result in Table 6 is that there appears to be strong evidence for
home bias when we consider the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity
(columns (1)-(3)). Of the 252 tests24 for no home bias, we reject 150 at the 5% level,
or around 60%. This is consistent with evidence from the analysis of citations data in
other econometric studies (Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Jaﬀe et al, 2005; Thompson
and Fox-Kean, 2005). However, the picture changes when we control for unobserved
heterogeneity (columns (4) through (6)). Comparing column (5) to column (2), for
example, the rejection rate (the proportion of possible rejections that are in fact rejected)
falls from 60% to 31%. In other words, there are far fewer rejections of home bias once
we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Controlling for censoring makes relatively little
diﬀerence to the total number of rejects in columns (7) through (9), the rejection rate
is the same in column (8), where we control for censoring, as in column (5), where we
do not, although it does aﬀect some of the individual results.
The impact of controlling for unobserved cited patent eﬀects can also be seen graphi-
cally in Figure 3. For each sector, the left hand side diagrams shows the pattern without
controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects (no FE), whereas the right hand side presents results from
long standing comparative advantage in the Chemical industry. Arora, Landau and Rosenberg (1999)
emphasise the historically strong international links of scientists working in organic chemistry in Ger-
many. Another possible reason is that public sector investment in applied research in Germany has taken
quite a diﬀerent form than in other countries, notably the major investments by the government in the
Fraunhofer Institutes, which has included several located in the US (see http://www.fraunhofer.de/en/).
24Seven country regressions and six country dummies for each regression gives 42 tests for each sector.
19our preferred speciﬁcations with controls for ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring (FE + C). It is
clear that the proportion of large circles (evidence of signiﬁcantly slower citations by an-
other country) falls when moving from the no-ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations to the preferred
speciﬁcations. This phenomenon is much less apparent in Computers and Communica-
tions - in Table 6 the number of rejections generally halves when we move between the
no ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations of column (2) to the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations of column
(5), yet for Computers and Communications the number of rejections essentially remains
the same. There are far fewer rejections even without ﬁxed eﬀects for Computers, while
once we control for unobserved quality (column (5) Table 6) The number of rejections
is quite similar across industries.
Why does unobserved heterogeneity not lead to the same sort of bias in Computers
as it did in other industries? That is hard to say. The bias from omitted unobserved
heterogeneity is not easily signed and could in principle go in either direction (see foot-
note 5). In the raw data (when we do not control for unobserved quality) it seems that
the computer industry is very international compared to other industries, yet when we
control for unobserved quality this wipes out most of this diﬀerence by reducing the
evidence for home bias in other industries.
A second feature of Table 6 and Figure 3 is that the models without ﬁxed eﬀects
suggest a sectoral pattern with less home bias in the “modern” sectors of Electrical and
Electronic and Computers and Communications than in the more traditional sectors (e.g.
Chemicals). This is similar to Peri (2005) who ﬁnds that knowledge spreads much more
quickly across regional boundaries in the computer and communication sector. However,
once we control for unobserved heterogeneity the sectors look relatively similar.
A third feature of Figure 3 is that the Rest of World (mainly non-OECD countries)
are consistently slower in citing the patents of the OECD countries. This suggests that
non-OECD countries are more “cut-oﬀ” from international pools of knowledge, either
20because of their distance, infrastructure or development levels.
4.2 Falling home bias over time?
We now turn to the important issue of whether home bias has fallen over time, as some
commentators have suggested (e.g. due to the falling costs of international communi-
cation and/or travel). We divide our sample into an “early” period (1975-1989) and
a “late” period (1990-1999) where there are a similar absolute number of citations in
each period (see Table 2). We re-estimate all of our models on these two sub-periods
separately. We report a summary of these results in Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 4.25 It
is particularly important to control for censoring in this comparison, as the results from
the second period will be much more aﬀected by censoring than the former period.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 we see that there is a large decline in rejection
rates over time. No home bias is rejected in 48% of cases in the early period, but only
for 28% of cases in the later period (in the table we report results at the 5% signiﬁcance
level). In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the exercise, but focus on OECD countries.26
There is substantial home bias for the non-OECD countries, as noted above, so we
wanted to check that the time series changes are not being driven by them alone. It is
clear that the main patterns of results stand up. Although the absolute level of home
bias is lower, the fall in the degree of home bias is dramatic. On average the rejection
rate falls from 47% to 24%. The ﬁnal two columns look within the European countries
(counting rejections only on European country dummy coeﬃcients of European-country-
cited-patent regressions). The patterns are similar, with a large decline in home bias.
As we saw above, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important. In Table 8
we ﬁnd that in most cases in both periods, the level of home bias is lower when we control
25The full results of these estimations are available on request from the authors.
26In other words we report the number of rejections for country dummy coeﬃcients dropping the
“Rest of the World” coeﬃcients and also dropping coeﬃcients from the “Rest of the World” cited
patent regressions.
21for ﬁxed eﬀects (and censoring), but the reduction in home bias is more substantial in
the early period than in the later period (the rejection rate falls from 30% to 22%).
The reduction in home bias over time is less striking, because there is less evidence of
home bias existing in the ﬁrst place. Looking at the ﬁrst two columns of Table 8 we
see that home bias declined in Chemicals, Electrical and Mechanical. By contrast in
Computers and Communication (ICT) and Drugs, the “modern” sectors, we see little
change (if anything an increase in the number of rejections). At ﬁrst glance this might
seem surprising as it is commonly assumed that ICT leads to delocalization.
Our aim in this paper is to identify “stylized facts” on home bias; what we identify
is a reduced form of various structural inﬂuences that could slow down knowledge dif-
fusion. What might these structural inﬂuences be? First, there are explicit information
acquisition and communication costs that make it harder for inventors in country A to
learn about inventions in country B because of telecommunication prices. The advent
of e-mail, cellular phones, the Internet, liberalization of state telephone monopolies, etc.
has clearly reduced the costs of these explicit costs. In opposition to this there are var-
ious agglomeration eﬀects which will tend to make local interaction more important (at
least in some sectors). When technologies are complex and/or at an early stage then
local communication to facilitate the transfer of tacit know-how may be particularly
important.
ICT and pharmaceuticals are the two sectors where there has been the most dis-
cussion of “clustering” (e.g. ICT in Silicon Valley and biotechnology in Cambridge,
Massachusetts)27. These results are also shown in Figure 4, where the left hand side
diagrams are of the early period and the right hand side diagrams are of the late period:
the later period has far fewer “circles” (evidence for home bias) than the earlier period.
It is plausible that in Computers and Communications agglomeration eﬀects may
have become stronger over time (relative to other sectors) so as to oﬀset the falling com-
27For example see Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) on biotechnology.
22munication costs that they would disproportionately beneﬁt from. It is hard to produce
direct evidence to support this case, but there is some indirect evidence consistent with
this idea. First, in terms of technological complexity, the ICT-producing industries have
enjoyed very rapid technological change over our sample period. Quality-adjusted prices
for computers were falling at something like 15% per annum until the early 1990s after
which the price falls accelerated to around 30%. This appeared to be partially driven by
a speed-up in the technological cycle of the semi-conductor industry28. Rapid techno-
logical change is thought to make face to face communication and geographically-based
knowledge spillovers more important.
Second, the geographical clustering of the ICT industry appears to have strengthened
rather than weakened over time. For example, despite high wages and land prices in
Silicon Valley leading software companies such as Apple, Oracle or Google have not
chosen to decamp en masse, but seem to beneﬁt from proximity to other ICT-oriented
ﬁrms.
Third, several recent papers have pointed to the rise of “superstar cities” with high
skilled workers and high tech industries and workers increasingly co-located in the same
localities (for example, Gyourko et al, 2006). These cities (such as San Francisco and
New York) have an increasing concentration of graduate workers and high tech jobs
and have lead to increasing spatial inequality. There are various hypotheses that could
explain this, but one leading explanation is that high-tech sectors, such as ICT, are
increasing clustered in certain areas and this generates demand for high skilled workers
(for example, Moretti, 2010).
While we cannot be certain that these are the reasons that there we do not see a fall
in home bias in some industries, the most likely rationalization seems to be an increased
importance of agglomeration has oﬀset the fall in explicit communication costs along
28Some authors go so far to say that the productivity acceleration in the US was in large part due to
accelerated technical progress in ICT (Jorgenson, 2001 and van Ark et al, 2008).
23the lines discussed.
One of the things that Figure 4 shows quite clearly is that in the early period the US
had a substantial advantage in terms of “absorptive capacity”, US ﬁrms were quick to
learn from and cite European patents, while European ﬁrms were slower to cite US ﬁrms
and each other. In the later period European ﬁrms now cite US patents more quickly,
and the US has lost this advantage. We see this by comparing the “US” row for US
cited patents in the early period (on the left-hand side) with the later period (the US
row on the right-hand side). The evidence of home bias (large circles) has been replaced
by evidence of no home bias (a dot) or in some cases even evidence of more speedy
knowledge ﬂows (indicated by pluses). This is true in all industries except Computers,
where the US seems to have maintained its advantage in terms of absorptive capacity.
The obvious conclusion is that home bias has fallen, and it has fallen in those sectors
where one would a priori expect it to fall. This seems to be the new concrete quantitative
evidence for an aspect of globalization that is much discussed - the increasing propensity
of knowledge to slip over geographic boundaries. Our conclusion is consistent with Keller
(2002) who shows geographic localization declined over time between countries, using a
model in which productivity depends on domestic and foreign R&D and the eﬀectiveness
of foreign R&D is negatively related to the distance from the foreign economy, and also
consistent with recent evidence from Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006) that the “spillover”
beneﬁts that academics obtain from their colleagues within the same university are less
important now than they were two decades ago.
4.3 Using longer lags of citations
Our baseline results use only the ﬁrst two citations to measure home bias. Why not use
the third, fourth, ﬁfth, etc. citation? Our main reason is because we believe that the
theoretically relevant information is contained in the ﬁrst few citations. This is before
the patent has become more general public knowledge, it is when information is the
24most tacit. After the patent has been published and cited it becomes codiﬁed, and there
is less reason to believe that geography should matter. In addition, we have argued for
a smaller number of citations on grounds of theory (the ﬁrst few cites are likely to be
where home bias is greatest due to tacitness of knowledge) and parsimony (we need at
least two observations to “diﬀerence out” the ﬁxed eﬀect, so the ﬁrst two citations is the
minimum number).
Nevertheless, to tackle this issue directly we also checked the robustness of our results
to including the third and fourth cites. The conditional likelihood estimator developed
in Section 2 can easily be extended for more than two citations. Suppose that J = 3,
i.e. that there are three potential citing patents. Then it is straightforward to show that
the probability that the observed second citation is second, conditional on the durations
of the ﬁrst and second citations, has the logit form as in equation (1), independent of
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, this implies that one can obtain another censored ﬁxed
eﬀect estimator in exactly the same way as in equation (2) by replacing the subscripts
1 and 2 with subscript 2 and 3, respectively.29
Our qualitative ﬁndings did not change.30 For example, in Table 6, for the 5%
level, the number of rejections falls from 150 (No FE) to 77 (FE+C) as we control for
unobserved heterogeneity of citing patents and the censoring problem. When we use the
second and third citations, for the same level, the number of rejections changes from 130
(No FE) to 75 (FE+C); when we use the third and fourth citations, the number falls
from 121 (No FE) to 48 (FE+C). The larger decline with the third and fourth citations
is consistent with our conjecture that geography is less important as the patent becomes
more general public knowledge.
29Similarly, if J = 4, one can show that the probability that the observed third citation is third,
conditional on the durations of the ﬁrst, second and third citations has the logit form again, independent
of unobserved heterogeneity. Then one can obtain yet another censored ﬁxed estimator exactly the same
way as in equation (2) by replacing the subscripts 1 and 2 with subscript 3 and 4, respectively.
30See Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix.
254.4 The importance of controlling for base of citing patents
Our speciﬁcations include a control for the number of citing patents (the “base”) by
country and technology class. Although this might seem natural, in our econometric
speciﬁcation we may not need to control for it because the partial likelihood estimator
is based on the partial likelihood of the identity (including origin country) of the ﬁrst
citation, given the time of this ﬁrst citation and the identities of the ﬁrst two citations.
However, our alternative interpretation is that the legal and organizational changes to
the patent system led to large increase in patenting in some technology class/country
pairs that led to falls in average patent quality. Indeed the coeﬃcient on base is robustly
negative, consistent with this interpretation.
We re-estimated all our regressions dropping base which led in the main to qualitively
similar results. In particular, we found evidence of home bias weakening both with ﬁxed
eﬀects and over time. We did ﬁnd, however, that other countries appeared to cite US
inventors more quickly than inventors in their own countries when we failed to control
for base (e.g. more crosses in the row marked “US” in Table 3). We suspect that this
is because many countries took advantage of looser rules on US patenting to expand
their portfolios and also cited more out of fear of litigation. Conditioning on the total
number of cited patents controls for this bias and restores the result that (in general)
other countries cite themselves more quickly than they do US inventors.
4.5 Further Robustness tests
Could there be other reasons why the apparent decline in home bias is spurious? Firstly, a
concern may be that the number of rejections of home bias has fallen because the number
of observations is lower in the late period. But Table 2 shows that if anything the number
of patents is slightly higher in the later period (1.107 million vs. 1.031 million), so this
cannot be the reason. Secondly, could it be that the diﬀerential quality of patents has
26caused this to occur? For example, a lot of the decline in Figure 4 is because European
ﬁrms have become relatively faster at citing US patents, and Japanese ﬁrms have become
relatively slower. Our technique of using multiple cites to “diﬀerence out” the ﬁxed eﬀect
means that we have controlled for cited patent quality. Consequently, diﬀerential quality
cannot be the reason for the patterns we observe in Table 8 (but it might be the reason
for the patterns observed in Table 7 which does not control for ﬁxed eﬀects). Thirdly,
we also tried using diﬀerent cut-oﬀ years and found that this lead to similar results. For
example, we obtain qualitatively similar results using 1985 as a cut-oﬀ year with the
censored ﬁxed eﬀect estimator - in chemicals the number of rejections using all countries
decreases from 13 in the pre-1985 period to 8 in the post-1985 period and in mechanical
engineering the fall was from 12 to 5.31 See Table A6 in the Appendix for the details.
A ﬁnal concern is that our results might be driven by self-citations. Of course,
the positive coeﬃcient on self-citations may reﬂect some degree of localized knowledge
spillovers and so is of interest in its own right. Nevertheless, self-citations could reﬂect
a bias simply to over-cite oneself, so we re-estimated all models dropping self citations.
This made little diﬀerence to the preferred results with ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring. For
example, the number of rejections at the 5% level in Table 6 fell merely from 77 to 76.
Dropping self-citations did make more of a diﬀerence for the no ﬁxed eﬀects models,
however, with the number of rejections falling from 150 in column (2) to 118 when we
drop self-citations. We conclude that another beneﬁt of our methodology is that it helps
correct for biases induced from self-citations. See Table A9 in the Appendix for the
details.
31As before, the “modern” sectors have seen an increase in the number of rejections from 7 to 9 in
pharmaceuticals and from 9 to 11 in electrical and electronic.
275 Conclusions
Patent citations have become an important source of information about the ways in
which knowledge ﬂows between ﬁrms and countries. But knowledge can spread more or
less quickly due to the unobservable characteristics of patents, which may be poorly cap-
tured by observable characteristics. In this paper we propose an econometric technique
for dealing with ﬁxed eﬀects in duration models that exploits the existence of multiple
citations on the same patent, and implements this estimator on a database of over two
million citations between 1975 and 1999. We have focused on the speed of knowledge
ﬂows between countries, which is a key feature of models of growth and international
trade. Many papers have argued that there is substantial “home bias” in the way that
knowledge is transmitted, in the sense that being geographically close makes knowledge
transfers easier, and this has become accepted wisdom in government support for clusters
and other forms of technology policy.
We ﬁnd that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity makes a large quantitative and
qualitative diﬀerence to estimates of home bias in innovative activity. First, the evidence
for home bias is much weaker once we control for ﬁxed eﬀects (and censoring). The non-
ﬁxed eﬀects models (which are standard in the literature) suggest home bias in a majority
of cases, whereas our preferred models indicate home bias in only a minority of cases.
Second, and perhaps most provocatively, we ﬁnd evidence that home bias has declined
over time, being much stronger in the pre-1990 period than the post-1990 period. We
interpret this as suggesting that information ﬂows more easily across national boundaries
as the cost of international communication and travel has fallen. Furthermore, there is
heterogeneity in the fall in home bias: it has not occurred in the more high tech sectors
of ICT and pharmaceuticals, precisely those areas where clusters and agglomeration
are believed to be important. This suggests that international boundaries may be less
important, but that in many sectors distance is far from dead.
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Notes: This graph shows the relative time (in mean number of day) from the date that a Germany inventor was granted a patent until the first citation of that patent, 
by the location of the inventor that made the first citation. For example, the first bar (diagonal bricks) for France in the early period indicates that when the first 
citation to a Germany patent was made by a French inventor this citation took on average 25% longer than when the first citation was made by a Germany 
inventor (i.e. the mean citation length to a German inventor was 1383 days compared to 1729 days (1729=1383*1.25) to a French inventor). 
Table1 shows the raw numbers for all cells. `DE' = Germany, `FR' = France, `GB' = Great Britain, `EU' = remaining EU countries together, `JP' = Japan, `US' = 
United States and `RW' = the rest of the world. In particular, `EU' consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Estimation Results
Notes: Each cell in Figure 2 corresponds to the equivalent coeﬃcient in column (3) of Table 4. A
circle represents a negative coeﬃcient (home bias) and a cross represents a positive coeﬃcient. The
size of the circle or the cross corresponds to the level of statistical signiﬁcance of a one-side test for
the null hypothesis that the corresponding coeﬃcient is zero. A large circle represents signiﬁcance
at the 1% level, a medium circle signiﬁcance at the 5% level, a small circle signiﬁcance at the 10%
level, and a tiny circle insigniﬁcance at the 10% level. The same ordering applies to crosses. The
leading diagonal corresponds to the omitted variable in each regression and therefore no coeﬃcient is
estimated. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations from the European
Countries. ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries
together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’
consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
35Figure 3: No Fixed Eﬀects (“No FE”) and Fixed Eﬀects with Censoring (“FE+C”)
Panel A: No Fixed Eﬀects Panel B: Censored Fixed Eﬀects
Notes: For each sector, the left-hand side diagram shows the pattern without controlling for ﬁxed
eﬀects whereas the right-hand side presents results from our preferred speciﬁcations with controls for
ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations
from the European Countries. ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ =
remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the
world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
36Figure 3: No Fixed Eﬀects (“No FE”) and Fixed Eﬀects with Censoring (“FE+C”) (Continued)
Panel A: No Fixed Eﬀects Panel B: Censored Fixed Eﬀects
Notes: For each sector, the left-hand side diagram shows the pattern without controlling for ﬁxed
eﬀects whereas the right-hand side presents results from our preferred speciﬁcations with controls for
ﬁxed eﬀects and censoring. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines contains the cross-citations
from the European Countries. ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ =
remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the
world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
37Figure 4: Early Period vs. Late Period
Panel A: Early Period (1975-1989) Panel B: Late Period (1990-1999)
Notes: The left-hand side diagrams are estimation results for the early period (1975-1989) and
the right hand side diagrams are for the late period (1990-1999). Estimation results are from our
preferred ﬁxed eﬀects plus censoring speciﬁcations. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines
contains the cross-citations from the European Countries. ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’
= Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and
‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
38Figure 4: Early Period vs. Late Period (Continued)
Panel A: Early Period (1975-1989) Panel B: Late Period (1990-1999)
Notes: The left-hand side diagrams are estimation results for the early period (1975-1989) and
the right hand side diagrams are for the late period (1990-1999). Estimation results are from our
preferred ﬁxed eﬀects plus censoring speciﬁcations. The upper left quadrant with dashed lines
contains the cross-citations from the European Countries. ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’
= Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and
‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
39Table 1: Time to ﬁrst citation, by cited and citing inventor location
Period: 1975 - 1989
Citing:
DE FR GB EU JP US RW
Cited:
DE 1383 1729 1620 1812 1629 1901 1963
FR 1723 1377 1698 1806 1712 1874 2016
GB 1743 1767 1223 1802 1675 1868 2059
EU 1748 1750 1773 1460 1708 1960 2051
JP 1445 1516 1482 1548 1121 1534 1851
US 1801 1849 1815 1936 1695 1742 2179
RW 1859 1880 1931 1962 1859 2076 1635
Period: 1990 - 1999
Citing:
DE FR GB EU JP US RW
Cited:
DE 880 986 1066 1040 933 1054 1056
FR 1028 872 1002 1030 944 1052 1052
GB 983 1005 800 985 892 1022 1033
EU 1009 977 991 874 919 1038 1019
JP 897 895 934 965 764 905 853
US 951 945 959 978 844 891 943
RW 999 978 1024 994 851 1014 800
Notes: The table shows the mean number of day from the date that a cited inventor was granted
a patent until the ﬁrst citation of that patent, by the location of the inventor that made the ﬁrst
citation. For example, the number in the top panel for the ﬁrst French (FR) citation to a German
(DE) patents in the early period indicates that when the ﬁrst citation to a Germany patent was
made by a French inventor this citation took on average 1729 days. The top and bottom panels show
the average time to ﬁrst citation for the period of 1975 to 1989 and that of 1990 to 1999, respectively.
‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together,
‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden.
40Table 2: Sample Sizes of Patent Citation Data
Technological Period Country of Cited Patents
Category DE FR GB EU JP US RW Total
Chemical All 46697 13840 14414 21662 73211 231594 27714 429132
Early 26663 7355 8802 11173 32385 130532 14388 231298
Late 20034 6485 5612 10489 40826 101062 13326 197834
Computers All 8485 6725 6236 7781 70657 134335 12830 247049
and Communications Early 4094 3137 2713 2904 19808 45308 2763 80727
Late 4391 3588 3523 4877 50849 89027 10067 166322
Drugs All 12578 6992 7862 9887 18044 115365 12612 183340
and Medical Early 5841 2741 3494 3391 6763 38777 4472 65479
Late 6737 4251 4368 6496 11281 76588 8140 117861
Electrical All 25723 12029 10585 13942 85591 193424 25467 366761
and Electronic Early 14251 6374 6448 7300 30747 97099 8003 170222
Late 11472 5655 4137 6642 54844 96325 17464 196539
Mechanical All 46260 13976 13837 24266 96811 240766 31535 467451
Early 26429 8220 8979 14009 42672 133759 14822 248890
Late 19831 5756 4858 10257 54139 107007 16713 218561
Others All 30064 11452 12117 21711 46330 284448 38853 444975
Early 17475 6519 7438 12214 21275 151837 17383 234141
Late 12589 4933 4679 9497 25055 132611 21470 210834
Total All 169807 65014 65051 99249 390644 1199932 149011 2138708
Early 94753 34346 37874 50991 153650 597312 61831 1030757
Late 75054 30668 27177 48258 236994 602620 87180 1107951
Notes: Data consist of patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999. The patents in the data
were all taken out at the United States Patent Oﬃce (USPTO). A country of cited patents refers
to the location of an applicant: ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ =
remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the
world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Period ‘All’ includes years from 1975 to
1999 in which cited patents are granted. ‘Early’ and ‘Late’ Periods correspond to 1975-1989 and
1990-1999, respectively.
41Table 3: Summary Statistics for Patent Citation Data
Variable Chemical Computers and Drugs and Electrical and Mechanical Others
Communications Medical Electronic
Proportion of patents 0.56 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.54 0.49
with two or more citations
Proportion of patents 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17
with only one citation
Proportion of patents 0.28 0.26 0.37 0.25 0.30 0.34
with no citation
Proportion of self-citation 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.14
(ﬁrst citation)
Proportion of self-citation 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12
(second citation)
Proportion of same technology 0.65 0.71 0.76 0.67 0.68 0.68
class (ﬁrst citation)
Proportion of same technology 0.63 0.71 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.66
class (second citation)
Average of Base 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.16
(ﬁrst citation)
Average of Base 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.17
(second citation)
Notes: Data consist of patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999. The patents in the data
were all taken out at the United States Patent Oﬃce (USPTO). The base variable is deﬁned as the
number of patents in the citing country and technology sub-category for the citing year. (1 unit =
1,000 patents).
42Table 4: Estimation Results
Technological Category: Chemical
Country of Cited Patents: Germany (DE)
Sample Size: 46697; Obs. with at least two citations: 25016
(1) (2) (3)
Variable No Fixed Eﬀect Fixed Eﬀect Fixed Eﬀect plus Censoring
FR -0.15 -0.03 -0.03
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.08 )
GB -0.03 0.03 0.02
( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.08 )
EU -0.12 -0.04 0.04
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 )
JP 0.03 0.00 0.00
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
US -0.08 -0.02 0.05
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.05 )
RW -0.13 -0.12 -0.14
( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 )
Self Cit. 0.38 0.39 0.48
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 )
Tech.Class 0.16 0.15 0.15
( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
Base -0.15 -0.53 -0.80
( 0.06 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.12 )
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. The dummy variables for the location of an applicant
of citing patent are ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’ = France, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’
= Japan, ‘US’ = United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden. The omitted category in citing patent country dummies is Great Britain (GB).
The Self Citation and Technology Class variables are dummy variables. The Base variable is the
number of patents in citing country and subcategory for the citing year (one unit = 1,000 patents).
Diﬀerent columns show diﬀerent estimates. Column (1) shows no-ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates using the
only ﬁrst citation duration, Column (2) shows ﬁxed-eﬀect (FE) estimates using ﬁrst two citation
durations, and Column (3) shows FE estimates accounting for censoring.
43Table 5: Estimation Results of Chemical (FE + C)
Chemical (FE + C) - Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Country of Country of Citing Patents
Cited Patents DE FR GB EU JP US RW
DE -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.14
( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.07 )
FR 0.03 -0.01 -0.25 -0.10 -0.02 -0.33
( 0.11 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.14 )
GB -0.10 -0.32 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.29
( 0.09 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.11 )
EU 0.07 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.18
( 0.08 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.10 )
JP -0.03 -0.23 -0.17 -0.24 0.03 -0.24
( 0.04 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.05 )
US 0.01 -0.15 -0.10 -0.22 -0.06 -0.24
( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 )
RW 0.15 -0.14 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.08
( 0.09 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.08 )
Notes: Each row contains parameter estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses) from a
separate multiple-spell duration model for each country. The censored ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (FE+C)
is used with the entire sample for a technology category called “Mechanical”. The country name in
the ﬁrst column corresponds to the location of the patent’s inventor, which is subsequently cited.
The country names in columns (1) through (7) correspond to the inventor location of the patent
which subsequently cites the original patent. The left-out base country dummy is the cited patent’s
country. Country codes with corresponding country names are as follows: ‘DE’ = Germany, ‘FR’
= France, ‘GB’ = Great Britain, ‘EU’ = remaining EU countries together, ‘JP’ = Japan, ‘US’ =
United States and ‘RW’ = the rest of the world. In particular, ‘EU’ consists of Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
In addition to country dummies, each hazard regression includes, as explanatory variables, dummy
variables for self citation and technology class and the number of patents in citing country and
subcategory for the citing year.
44Table 6: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Technological Max. # of No FE FE FE+C
Category rejections 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1%
Chemical 42 34 32 23 16 12 9 14 14 12
Computers 42 18 17 10 16 14 14 17 15 15
& Communications
Drugs 42 26 24 18 15 11 5 15 10 6
& Medical
Electrical 42 22 19 16 13 13 11 15 14 12
& Electronic
Mechanical 42 26 25 17 16 13 6 15 11 9
Others 42 36 33 30 20 14 11 15 13 11
Total 252 162 150 114 96 77 56 91 77 65
Percentage 0.64 0.60 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.26
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided t-tests for individual coeﬃcients is shown in each
cell of the table. Three levels of tests are considered: 1%, 5%, and 10 %. Also, three diﬀerent
estimators are used: no-ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator (No FE) using only ﬁrst citation duration, ﬁxed-eﬀect
(FE) estimator using ﬁrst two spells, and censored ﬁxed eﬀect (FE+C) estimator.
45Table 7: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: No Fixed Eﬀect Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 23 8 17 6 5 0
Computers 16 5 12 2 3 1
and Communications
Drugs 18 9 12 7 4 3
and Medical
Electrical 16 17 11 9 2 2
and Electronic
Mechanical 18 14 12 9 2 1
Others 30 18 21 11 7 1
Total 121 71 85 44 23 8
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.48 0.28 0.47 0.24 0.32 0.11
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coeﬃcients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1989) and for the late period (1990-1999) separately.
The columns under “All countries” show the number of rejections for all coeﬃcients for country
dummies (42 coeﬃcients), those under “OECD countries” show the number of rejections for country
dummy coeﬃcients dropping the “Rest of the World” coeﬃcients and also coeﬃcients from “Rest
of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result, 30 coeﬃcients), and those under “EU countries”
show the number of rejections for EU country dummy coeﬃcients of EU cited patent regressions
(hence, further reduced to 12 coeﬃcients). The test results are based on the no ﬁxed eﬀect (No FE)
estimator.
46Table 8: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: Censored Fixed Eﬀect Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 13 7 9 4 1 0
Computers 13 15 10 10 1 2
& Communications
Drugs 9 10 6 7 1 4
& Medical
Electrical 12 6 9 5 0 1
& Electronic
Mechanical 15 8 12 5 4 1
Others 14 10 10 6 2 2
Total 76 56 56 37 9 10
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.30 0.22 0.31 0.21 0.12 0.14
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coeﬃcients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1989) and for the late period (1990-1999) separately. The
columns under “All countries” show the number of rejections for all coeﬃcients for country dummies
(42 coeﬃcients), those under “OECD countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy
coeﬃcients dropping the “Rest of the World” coeﬃcients and also coeﬃcients from “Rest of the
World” cited patent regressions (as a result, 30 coeﬃcients), and those under “EU countries” show
the number of rejections for EU country dummy coeﬃcients of EU cited patent regressions (hence,
further reduced to 12 coeﬃcients). The test results are based on the censored ﬁxed eﬀect (FE+C)
estimator.
47A Econometric Appendix
A.1 Likelihood Function with Censoring
The censoring time Ci for patent i is deﬁned as the number of days from the date of patent i be-
ing granted to the common censoring date. We assume that the censoring time Ci is independent
(Y ∗
ij,Xij,Ui) and identically distributed with an unknown probability distribution. Furthermore, we
assume that the support of Ci is the whole real line. Under this censoring mechanism, our data consist
of {(Yij,∆ij,Xij,Ci) : i = 1,...,n,j = 1,...,J}, where Yij = min(Y ∗
ij,Ci) and ∆ij = 1(Y ∗
ij < Ci).
Here, 1( ) is the usual indicator function. Thus, we observe uncensored citation durations only when
∆ij = 1, that is citation durations are less than the censoring time.
In this paper, we propose a modiﬁed version of the conditional likelihood estimator to correct for
the selection bias. Speciﬁcally, the proposed estimator of β, say ˆ β, maximizes the following weighted

























where Gn( ) is an estimator of the survivor function G( ) of the censoring time Ci, in particular Gn(c) =
n−1 Pn
i=1 1(Ci > c). Our econometric framework is based on a continuous-time duration model, which
is suitable for our application since we have citation durations measured in days. However, it is possible
to have ties and they are included in both contributed terms in (A1). Observe that the selection
bias is corrected for by multiplying weights Gn(max{Yi1,Yi2})−1 in equation (A1). The reason why







i2,Xi1,Xi2] = 1 (A2)
In other words, (A1) converges in probability uniformly over b to a limiting function to which an
infeasible log-likelihood function would converge under no censoring. In maximizing (A1), we trim
away 0.5% of observations with the smallest values of Gn(max[Yi1,Yi2]) to mitigate the leverage of
outliers.
A.2 Asymptotic Distribution of the Censored Fixed-Eﬀect Estimator
This section of the appendix describes regularity conditions under which the censored ﬁxed-eﬀect es-
timator is consistent and asymptotically normal. Also, it gives the form of asymptotic variance of the
censored ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator.
Assumption A.1 (1) β is an interior point of a compact subset of Rd for some ﬁnite d. (2) The
data {(Yi1,Yi2,Xi1,Xi2,∆i1,∆i2,Ci) : i = 1,...,n} are independent and identically distributed. (3)
Y ∗
i1 and Y ∗
i2 are independent of each other conditional on (Xi1,Xi2,Ui). (4) λi( ) is strictly posi-
tive. (5) E
h
 Xi1 − Xi2 
2
i
< ∞ and E[(Xi1 − Xi2)(Xi1 − Xi2)′] is nonsingular. (6) The censoring
48variable Ci is random with an unknown continuous probability distribution. (7) Ci is independent of
(Y ∗
i1,Y ∗
i2,Xi1,Xi2,Ui). (8) The survivor function of Ci, G(c) ≡ Pr(Ci > c) is positive for every c ∈ R,
and furthermore, it is bounded away from zero.
These assumptions are not unrestrictive, but in our application, they might be viewed as plausible.
Recall that citation durations are obtained by looking at all recorded citations as of December 31st, 1999.
Hence, the censoring variable is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between this particular end date and the date
when a patent is granted. It is reasonable that the censoring time Ci is independent of potential citation
durations Y ∗
ij, the attributes of the citing patent Xij, and the heterogeneity term Ui, because the dates
of patents being granted may have little to do with underlying patent-citing processes.1 Also, the full
support condition (8) on the censoring time is not so restrictive in our application given that we follow
patent citations over a long period and we focus mainly on the ﬁrst two citations. The assumption that
G( ) is bounded away from zero is useful to ensure that our estimator behaves regularly. For example,
see Khan and Tamer (2010) for general issues regarding inverse weight estimation.
Let








































Then the following theorem gives the asymptotic normality of the censored ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator.
Theorem A.1 Let Assumption A.1 hold. Assume that Ω exists and is ﬁnite. Then as n → ∞,
√
n(ˆ β − β) →d N(0,Ω). (A4)
The proof of Theorem A.1 is omitted and it can be proved as in the proof of Theorem 1 of Lee
(2008). The asymptotic variance Ω can be consistently estimated by





(ˆ Φi − ˆ ρi)(ˆ Φi − ˆ ρi)′
#
ˆ Γ−1,
1What we need is that the application and grant dates are independent of quality. However, the restriction that the
application date is independent of quality can be violated if there is a cohort eﬀect on cited patents such as technology
waves. Another problematic case would be if the time lag between the application date and the grant date is systematically
correlated with the quality of the patent. Then this would induce the dependence between the grant date and quality
even when the application date is exogenous.
49where Gni = Gn(max{Yi1,Yi2}),





[Xi1 − Xi2][Xi1 − Xi2]′ exp(X′






















A.3 Related Econometric Models in the Literature
A.3.1 Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999)
In Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999), the likelihood that a particular patent K (citing patent) granted in
year T will cite some patent k granted in year t (cited patent) has the form
α(k,K)   exp[−β1(k,K)   (T − t)]   {1 − exp[−β2   (T − t)]},
where α is a shift parameter that depends on the attributes of patents k and K, β1 is an obsolescence
parameter that also depends on the characteristics of patents k and K, and β2 is a diﬀusion parameter.
The ﬁrst exponential process, exp[−β1(T − t)], describes how knowledge becomes obsolete and the
second exponential process, 1 − exp[−β2(T − t)], models how knowledge diﬀuses. Since we focus on
the ﬁrst few citations, the aspect of knowledge obsolescence is far less important in our empirical work
than in Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999). Roughly speaking, a natural form of specializing the citation
frequency of Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) to our setup would be
PJT := α(k,K)   {1 − exp[−β2   (T − t)]}. (A5)
Note that our mixed proportional hazards model speciﬁcation gives the following citation frequency
PMPH := 1 − exp[−Λi(T − t)exp(x′
ijβ + ui)], (A6)
where Λi(u) :=
R u
0 λi(s)ds is the integrated baseline function. The Jaﬀe-Trajtenberg-style model in
(A5) assumes proportionality in terms of the citation frequency PJT; however, our mixed proportional
hazards model in (A6) takes the proportionality in terms of the hazard function. In general, these two
models are non-nested; however, if we assume that α(k,K) ≡ 1 but β2 may depend on xij and ui as
in (A6), then (A5) is a special case of (A6) with Λi(u) = u (no duration dependence in the baseline
hazards).
As we mentioned in the main text, we control for unobserved heterogeneity in a way that Jaﬀe and
50Trajtenberg (1999) do not. Still, we see our approach as a complement rather than a substitute for
Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) since strictly speaking, both models are non-nested.
A.3.2 Thompson (2006)
Thompson (2006) reports estimates from conditional logits with ﬁxed eﬀects for each cited patent.
Although our estimates are also from a conditional logit with ﬁxed eﬀects for cited patents, two methods
are quite distinct.
First of all, we need to worry about the problem of censoring since our framework is based on a
duration model; however, Thompson (2006) is free from censoring problems since he considers observed
pairs of cited/citing patents for the conditional logit. Furthermore, our conditional logit estimates use
an indicator whether citation from an inventor residing in the same country has a shorter duration as the
dependent variable and country dummies as important explanatory variables; whereas Thompson’s logit
estimates use an indicator whether both inventors of the cited/citing patents reside in the same country
as the dependent variable and an indicator variable whether the citation is added by the inventor as
the main explanatory variable.
Thompson (1996, Table 3)’s estimation results suggest that the localization of international knowl-
edge spillovers has not declined over time. However, two diﬀerent estimation results are associated with
diﬀerent samples of patent citation data. Thompson’s sample starts from all patents granted during the
ﬁrst week of January 2003 and having an institutional assignee and then pairs of cited/citing patents
are constructed by all patents cited in this particular cohort of citing patents. Our sample consists
of potentially cited patents between 1975 and 1999 and its corresponding ﬁrst few citing patents. In
short, Thompson’s data extract is based on citing patents; whereas, our data extract is based on cited
patents.
B Additional Data Description and Results
In this Appendix we include several tables showing additional results.
Table A1 shows a tabulation of the country of the ﬁrst patent citing each of the cited patents in our
data. The diagonal elements show that there is substantial home bias in the raw data. A problem we
face in evaluating the time taken until the ﬁrst patent is that not all patents have been cited. Estimating
on only those patents where observe two citations would lead to potential selection bias. Table A2 shows
the number of patents that are censored, by industry. Table A3 splits this down into the early and late
period, clearly showing that the censoring problem is much more signiﬁcant in the later period. Table
A4 shows this by cited country. This motivates our use of estimators that explicitly allow for censoring.
In investigating the change in home bias over time we have chosen 1990 as a cutoﬀ year because this
approximately balanced the number of citations in early and later years. In Table A5 and A6 we show
the robustness of the results to using the middle year of our sample period, 1985. As also discussed
in the main test, we focus on the ﬁrst two citations for a patent. We can easily extend our method
using also the third citation and quasi-diﬀerence between the second and third citation and we show
the results from doing this in Table A7. Similarly we can use up to the fourth citation (see Table A8).
Table A9 provides estimation results after dropping all self citations. Our results are robust to using
these alternative citations.
51Table A1: Raw data: home bias in ﬁrst citation
Citing:
Cited: DE FR GB EU JP US RW
DE 30.58 2.96 2.90 5.05 14.67 38.82 5.03
FR 8.56 19.00 3.37 5.24 13.29 45.18 5.36
GB 8.36 3.10 16.57 4.57 12.76 49.46 5.17
EU 8.98 3.41 2.81 21.21 13.15 44.18 6.25
JP 5.47 1.68 1.59 2.74 50.90 33.05 4.56
US 5.03 2.04 2.29 3.12 10.86 71.83 4.82
RW 7.17 2.64 2.47 4.63 12.49 49.00 21.61
Notes: Data consists of all patents that were granted between 1975 and 1999 (the cited patent) and the
ﬁrst patent to cite it (the citing patent). An element {i,j} in the Table shows the proportion of patents
granted to an inventor located in row-country i that are ﬁrst cited by an inventor in a column country
j. For example, element {1,2} indicates that 2.96% of patents from German inventors were ﬁrst cited
by an inventor in France.
Table A2: Censoring - many patents have not (yet) been cited
Chemicals Computer Drugs Electrical Mechanical Other Total
obs 2 cites 241,799 152,557 90,718 220,584 250,258 217,545 1,173,461
(56.35) (61.75) (49.48) (60.14) (53.54) (48.89) (54.87)
obs 1 cite 65,969 29,483 25,348 52,985 78,875 774,91 330,151
(15.37) (11.93) (13.83) (14.45) (16.87) (17.41) (15.44)
obs no cites 121,364 65,009 67,274 93,192 138,318 149,939 635,096
(28.28) (26.31) (36.69) (25.41) (29.59) (33.70) (29.70)
Notes: Each row indicates the number of observations that had at least two cites (“obs 2 cites”), one
cite (“obs 1 cite”) or no cites (“obs no cite”). The number in parentheses indicates the proportion of
observations by industry that had diﬀerent numbers of cites. For example, our dataset contains 254,301
cites to patents in the chemicals technology sector that had at least two cites.
52Table A3: Censoring - by early and late time period
1975-1989 Chemicals Computer Drugs Electrical Mechanical Other Total
obs 2 cites 166,715 69,718 48,007 133,242 169,426 151,371 738,479
(72.08) (86.36) (73.32) (78.28) (68.07) (64.65) (71.64)
obs 1 cite 31,987 6,324 8,268 20,397 39,596 39,510 146,082
(13.83) (7.83) (12.63) (11.98) (15.91) (16.87) (14.17)
obs no cites 32,596 4,685 9,204 16,583 39,868 43,260 146,196
(14.09) (5.80) (14.06) (9.74) (16.02) (18.48) (14.18)
1990-1999
obs 2 cites 75,084 82,839 42,711 87,342 80,832 66,174 434,982
(37.95) (49.81) (36.24) (44.44) (36.98) (31.39) (39.26)
obs 1 cite 33,982 23,159 17,080 32,588 39,279 37,981 184,069
(17.18) (13.92) (14.49) (16.58) (17.97) (18.01) (16.61)
obs no cites 88,768 60,324 58,070 76,609 98,450 106,679 488,900
(44.87) (36.27) (49.27) (38.98) (45.04) (50.60) (44.13)
Notes: This is the same as Table A2 except we now split into early and later years.
Table A4: Censoring - by cited country
cited country: DE FR GB EU JP US RW Total
obs 2 cites 91,587 33,852 36,684 49,356 229,321 668,492 64,169 1,173,461
(53.94) (52.07) (56.39) (49.73) (58.70) (55.71) (43.06) (54.87)
obs 1 cite 28,724 11,170 10,337 16,955 56,077 180,929 25,959 330,151
(16.92) (17.18) (15.89) (17.08) (14.36) (15.08) (17.42) (15.44)
obs no cites 49,496 19,992 18,030 32,938 105,246 350,511 58,883 635,096
(29.15) (30.75) (27.72) (33.19) (26.94) (29.21) (39.52) (29.70)
Notes: This is the same as Table A2 except we now split country. DE: Germany, FR: France, GB:
Great Britain, EU: other European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden), JP: Japan, US: United States, RW: Rest of
World.
53Table A5: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: No Fixed Eﬀect Estimator
Cutoﬀ Year: 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 24 20 18 15 6 5
Computers 14 9 11 5 2 1
and Communications
Drugs 15 14 8 8 2 4
and Medical
Electrical 16 18 10 10 1 1
and Electronic
Mechanical 19 23 13 14 3 4
Others 29 24 21 14 5 3
Total 117 108 81 66 19 18
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.26 0.25
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coeﬃcients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1984) and for the late period (1985-1999) separately. Note
that the tables in the main text use 1990 as the cut-oﬀ year. The columns under “All countries” show
the number of rejections for all coeﬃcients for country dummies (42 coeﬃcients), those under “OECD
countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy coeﬃcients dropping the “Rest of the
World” coeﬃcients and also coeﬃcients from “Rest of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result,
30 coeﬃcients), and those under “EU countries” show the number of rejections for EU country dummy
coeﬃcients of EU cited patent regressions (hence, further reduced to 12 coeﬃcients). The test results
are based on the no ﬁxed eﬀect (No FE) estimator.
54Table A6: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Sub-Samples
Estimation Method: Censored Fixed Eﬀect Estimator
Cutoﬀ Year: 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technological All countries OECD countries EU countries
Category Early Late Early Late Early Late
Chemical 13 8 8 4 1 0
Computers 12 13 9 10 1 1
& Communications
Drugs 7 9 5 6 0 2
& Medical
Electrical 9 11 7 7 0 1
& Electronic
Mechanical 12 5 9 2 3 0
Others 13 12 9 9 2 3
Total 66 58 47 38 7 7
Max. # of rejections 252 252 180 180 72 72
Percentage 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.10 0.10
Notes: The number of rejections of one-sided 5% t-tests for individual coeﬃcients is shown in each
cell of the table for the early period (1975-1984) and for the late period (1985-1999) separately. Note
that the tables in the main text use 1990 as the cut-oﬀ year. The columns under “All countries” show
the number of rejections for all coeﬃcients for country dummies (42 coeﬃcients), those under “OECD
countries” show the number of rejections for country dummy coeﬃcients dropping the “Rest of the
World” coeﬃcients and also coeﬃcients from “Rest of the World” cited patent regressions (as a result,
30 coeﬃcients), and those under “EU countries” show the number of rejections for EU country dummy
coeﬃcients of EU cited patent regressions (hence, further reduced to 12 coeﬃcients). The test results
are based on the censored ﬁxed eﬀect (FE+C) estimator.
55Table A7: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample with Second and Third Citation
Spells
Technological No FE FE FE+C
Category 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1 %
Chemical 30 26 19 13 12 5 12 8 3
Computers 26 20 15 15 14 8 18 15 8
& Communications
Drugs 25 19 7 16 12 9 15 13 11
& Medical
Electrical 20 16 15 17 12 9 21 16 10
& Electronic
Mechanical 26 22 19 22 17 11 17 14 9
Others 29 27 21 12 8 5 12 9 7
Total 156 130 96 95 75 47 95 75 48
Notes: This is equivalent of Table 6 in the main text except we use estimates based on the second and
third citation (instead of the ﬁrst and second citation).
Table A8: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias using Entire Sample with Third and Fourth Citation
Spells
Technological No FE FE FE+C
Category 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1 %
Chemical 28 22 17 13 11 6 11 8 4
Computers 20 17 11 11 10 9 13 11 8
& Communications
Drugs 22 14 7 12 9 4 12 8 6
& Medical
Electrical 24 20 16 14 11 8 17 11 8
& Electronic
Mechanical 23 20 16 8 6 3 9 5 3
Others 29 28 20 12 7 4 7 5 2
Total 146 121 87 70 54 34 69 48 31
Notes: This is equivalent of Table 6 in the main text except we use estimates based on the third and
fourth citation (instead of the ﬁrst and second citation).
56Table A9: Number of Rejections of No Home Bias Using Entire Sample (without Self- Citations)
Technological No FE FE FE+C
Category 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1 %
Chemical 27 25 21 16 12 9 14 14 9
Computers 16 13 6 14 13 12 17 15 12
& Communications
Drugs 19 18 11 14 10 5 13 10 6
& Medical
Electrical 20 16 15 13 11 11 13 13 10
& Electronic
Mechanical 20 19 10 14 11 7 15 13 8
Others 30 27 23 17 11 8 14 11 10
Total 132 118 86 88 68 52 86 76 55
Notes: This is equivalent of Table 6 in the main text except we re-estimate all models dropping self
citations.
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